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Abstract 
 
Is it still possible to see an act of violence and feel guilt? To feel a sense of 
complicity beyond social duty or desire?  
 
There have been questions similar to this in discussion for centuries now, in 
fact, many of the systems of thought dedicated to answering it invoke entire 
metaphysical apparatuses to provide for its completion. 
 
This one, however, is specific to our time. Is it even possible to feel guilt 
anymore? In an attempt to provide an outline of the ethical ramifications of 
complicity, this paper discusses the effects of Immanuel Kant on our present 
day understanding of violence and of ourselves. That is, there is none. 
Instead the shortcomings consist of an obfuscation of the dominant order and 
an obstruction of political action.  
 
By continuing from the historical analysis of the subject begun by Michel 
Foucault in his early writing, coupled with his assessment of disciplinary 
power from his earlier writings, these difficulties may not only become 
apparent, but also an issue that may hold the potential for change. In this 
light, it may be possible to consider an ethics of the subject as spectacle and 
progress towards, or at least entertain, the idea of  complicity. 
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At Republic 439e, Plato has Socrates tell us of Leontius, son of Aglaeon: 
 
On his way up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, he noticed the 
bodies of some criminals lying on the ground, with the executioner 
standing by them. He wanted to go and look at them, but at the same 
time he was disgusted and tried to turn away. He struggled for some 
time and covered his eyes, but at last the desire was too much for him. 
Opening his eyes wide, he ran up to the bodies and cried, ‘There you 
are, curse you, feast yourselves on this lovely sight’. (2003: 137) 
 
Here is a man torn apart by his conflicting desires; his torment and anguish 
represented as a moral dilemma. It appears Leontius is caught up by his 
desire to view the bodies of the recently executed criminals, except he also 
wishes to maintain an acceptable decorum and attempts to resist the urge. 
His dilemma is complicated enough, yet how is it so simple for us to discern? 
His reaction tells us all; it may be his intention to observe ‘justice in progress’, 
yet by his action Leontius risks the label of a social deviant. It is in this issue 
alone that his circumstances are revealed, since all actions are committed to 
the judgement of the dominant order and his decision is wrought by the 
potential punishment that he may receive, or as Michel Foucault distinguishes 
it: an individual does not choose to be insane but has insanity thrust upon 
them. (2006: 56) For Slavoj Žižek this is the ‘ought’ and ‘must’ of power and 
politics for the subject under dominion. (2006: 49) 
 
Hence the initial parameters that began our investigation are not shaped by 
intuition alone, but are formed by the question, ‘How does Leontius regard his 
own actions?’ In this manner we might represent the narrative thus: 
 
i. He is curious. 
ii. He is disgusted. 
iii. He struggles. 
iv. He approaches the bodies. 
v. He curses. 
 
In doing so we leave a crucial element undisclosed; to begin we may consider 
Leontius as being fixed by opposing forces, caught in a mental to-ing and fro-
ing before the stronger will wins out. By this we reveal the logic of his 
decision; except, it is not his own volition that Leontius regards as deviant, 
since in the schema of his struggle it is his eyes that are accorded an unruly 
will and he considers himself as a blameless victim.  
 
It is his eyes that wish to look upon the bodies of the criminals, whereas 
Leontius is ‘disgusted’ and wont to ‘turn away’, even covering his face to 
prevent his involvement in the act. By this duality Leontius attempts to both 
commit the crime and to remain an innocent bystander; it may appear that 
Leontius represents the struggle as his own, yet it is apparent on his eventual 
approach to the bodies that he regards himself as a spectator of his own 
actions: he curses his eyes, for it is they that have led him to stoop to such 
activities. 
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It may be a conceit, but the fact Leontius believed he had no recourse in the 
matter is an important issue; in this way, we see him as a man with a decision 
already foreclosed against his own participation, since the dominant order has 
manipulated the values by which it is to be judged: his is a choice between 
conforming to the social will, or else losing his privileged position within its 
order. In presenting his unwanted desire as an external manifestation 
Leontius concedes to us the limited agency he considers himself to possess; 
that is, he does not labour over a moral decision but rather a struggle internal 
to the hegemonic order and hidden under the guise of an ethical dilemma. It is 
as Foucault suggested when he referred to the dominant system as being 
tolerable only if it masked a substantial portion of itself. (1998: 86) 
 
If we consider those other actions that were available to Leontius, we begin to 
realise how much remains hidden: he might have protested against any 
further executions, or fought for the fair trial of future criminals; whatever his 
moral inclination, he could have followed it towards asserting his own action. 
Instead he is forced to submit to a decision that is divorced from his own 
concerns, where both choices relate to the dominant social will. It is his 
political action that is foreclosed. 
 
Not able to conceive of his full potential Leontius represents for us a Kantian 
individual, one that believes the only ethical act is one that ‘follows one’s 
desire’ and overlaps with ‘one’s duty.’ (Žižek, 2008: 166) Yet we can have no 
assurance that this is the case; it may instead be that our duty is overwritten 
onto our desires, or vice versa. In fact, according to Žižek, it is Kant, ‘driven by 
suspicion’, who admits that we cannot ever be sure if what we did was truly 
ethical and not sustained by some secret motive. (2008: 166) (Here though, 
Žižek is to be taken with the utmost care. His is an assessment heavily 
dependent upon psychoanalysis; particularly arguments raised by Jacques 
Lacan in his essay ‘Kant avec Sade’. In his approximation of the text Žižek 
sees Kant as the unequivocal, albeit unwitting emergent point of 
psychoanalytic thinking and distorts Kant accordingly). In his fear Kant 
‘commits an error’. As subjects under dominion we are divorced from our own 
moral teleology and left with no reason to intervene in a situation other than 
conformity to the social order. 
 
This is the impasse: today, the dominant thought is a Kantian response to 
events that effectively declines any direct role in the course of their 
proceedings and instead adopts a contemplative viewpoint from which any 
partisan stance is considered at best premature or at worst a product of a 
thoughtless zealotry. It is clear Leontius has made no such deliberate 
manoeuvre, but in the same manner as Kant he has sidestepped the issue of 
complicity in lieu of the much less demanding role of a conformist – at least it 
appears to be. So often Kant is praised for his humane moral system, one that 
both accords the authority of an absolute whilst also remaining flexible 
enough to accommodate momentary lapses and mistakes without recourse 
for punishment; yet by this token, he also relieves us of our own mode of 
subjectivation and in doing so leaves us open to the abuses of the hegemonic 
order. 
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Kant says, ‘I must recognise myself as universal subject. I must constitute 
myself in each of my actions as a universal subject by conforming to universal 
rules.’ (Foucault, 1991b: 372) Except these rules are no longer that of 
practical reason, but merely those of the hegemonic forces. In this way Kant 
demands the subject to question themselves: How can I constitute myself as 
a subject of ethics? Recognise myself as such? and by this introduces the 
means by which individuals are subjugated by the dominant order. (Foucault, 
1991b: 372) For Foucault, Kant represents another manner in which the 
subject constitutes itself via a relationship with its self taking place, except as 
such, each person becomes both the spectator of their own self-generation as 
well as a spectacle for the dominant system to ‘observe, judge, and ratify.’ 
(Armstrong, 2008: 29) 
 
Here is the instigation of the subject-as-spectacle; a review of the events 
outside the gates of Piraeus reveals how the subject no longer intervenes in 
any spectacle, let alone if it is a violent one. For Žižek it is Foucault who has 
misconceived the ‘ought-to-do’, believing it to be an ethical imperative, 
whereas, in fact, its role is always subsumed under the political ‘is’ and ‘must’ 
of power relations. Thereby the ‘subject-ought-to-do’ becomes the subject-
spectacle forced to act according to the dominant will; in this relationship 
violence has no ethical role. To judge the common dominance of the 
hegemonic state over its subjects, we need only turn to its viewing habits. 
 
Today more than ever, violence is a spectacle for us to behold; no longer do 
we consider ourselves in immediate relation to its effects, but rather 
bystanders to its taking place; no longer do we regard violence as a local 
event, but restricted to conflicts in distant lands; no longer do we view 
ourselves as involved in its occurrence, but consider our role as critical 
spectators to its cause and effect. (Sontag, 2003: 16) In our time violence is 
acknowledged by its visibility, as each massacre, each riot and revolt is 
marked by live news coverage and broadsheet headlines. Our access to 
thousands of violent events across the world, ‘brutal acts of torture, the 
picking out of eyes, the crushing of testicles’ (Žižek, 2008: 9), is only of value 
as a spectacle for our discernment. They are judged according to their 
humanitarian expense, their cultural, political and economic cost; they are not 
ethical dilemmas for us to embroil ourselves in deliberating over, but issues of 
‘ought’ and ‘is’ determined by social and political factors. (Ransom, 1997:1) It 
is no longer the role of the individual to confer value upon an event, but rather 
a symbolic spectator who discerns worth by its relation to the hegemonic 
order of society.  
  
This is not to say, that becoming a spectacle is inherently a mediated activity, 
since it goes beyond any individual discursive technique, institutional practice 
or experiential realm; instead, these merely are most prevalent manifestations 
today. They may seem dated, but those original discussion by Foucault 
around disciplinary power and panoptical regimes, represents a founding 
gesture in theorising an ethics in relation to spectacle. Whereas writers such 
as Paul Virilio and Guy Debord lack any sustained engagement with these 
ethical issues precisely because of their emphasis on the overwhelming 
dominance of the spectacle in mediating subject identities. 
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In this way, instead they merely highlight how all subjects become divorced 
from any ethical relationship with violent events, as each person, rather than 
depending on their own moral compass, accedes responsibility to the better 
judgement of their social and political circumstances. Hence the subject 
becomes reliant upon the common consensus, approved as such only by 
conforming to pre-agreed value judgements ratified via juridical rule and 
behavioural norms. It is apparent that this is not a conscious decision either, 
since such a choice would result in the dismissal of all ethical worth; and even 
today this is inconceivable en-masse. (Žižek, 2008: 45-46) Instead it occurs 
by a torsion in its presentation: it appears that the hegemonic order is founded 
under the duress of an ethical absolute and then appeals for an equivalent 
moral consensus, whereas in fact, it is the reverse that holds true, since the 
system itself conjures the impression of a moral consensus and passes it as 
the result of an ethical absolutism; except, even this consensus is itself an 
illusion fashioned by the hegemonic structure so as to initiate the situation. It 
is akin to suggesting that, ‘you should do this because everyone else does’ 
and ‘it must be right because not everyone can be wrong’. 
 
Thus by a sleight-of-hand the individual is convinced to yield responsibility to 
the symbolic spectator. In this manner, it is not necessarily a choice made by 
individuals themselves, but rather a pact made between each individual and 
the hegemonic order. As such each subject becomes the spectacle of their 
surroundings and is dislodged from a position as subject-spectator and 
reallocated the title of spectacle-subject; by renouncing ethical judgement to 
the spectator-other, they defer their moral obligation as a person, becoming 
themselves a spectacle for discernment. Is this not how it feels to be subject; 
under the watchful eye of a strict supervisor? Or even how a conscience feels; 
with an inner voice passing judgement over us? But it is not our own moral 
system that is in control here, but rather those who hold dominion over us in 
the structural order. Thus we are both divorced from any ethical involvement 
with our environment as well as from ourselves as moral individuals. 
  
This is an idea George Orwell gave emphatic expression to in his short article 
‘Shooting an Elephant’. Although published in 1936 it refers to a time when 
Orwell was commissioned in the Indian Imperial Police in the 1920s. It depicts 
a police officer, himself posted in Burma, who resorts to the execution of a 
elephant after it trampled a local man and rampaged through the streets of 
Moulmein during a period of intense hormonal aggression, otherwise known 
as ‘musth’. Orwell describes the situation for the unnamed narrator as a time 
where he was ‘hated by large numbers of people’ (2000: 18), yet of particular 
import though, is his description of the moment before the elephant is killed: 
 
I glanced round at the crowd that had followed me. It was an immense 
crowd, two thousand at the least and growing every minute. It blocked 
the road for a long distance on either side. … suddenly I realized that I 
should have to shoot the elephant after all. (Orwell, 2000: 22) 
 
It is apparent from the start that the officer is a spectacle for the people of 
Moulmein; he is under observation and because of it he feels their combined 
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will as an edict or command: ‘the people expected it of me and I had got to do 
it; I could feel their two thousand wills pressing me forward, irresistibly.’ 
(Orwell, 2000: 22) Orwell portrays the decision to kill the elephant as being 
‘out of his hands’:  
 
I had committed myself to doing it when I sent for the rifle. […] To come 
all that way, rifle in hand, with two thousand people marching at my 
heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing – no, that was 
impossible. (2000: 22) 
 
It is not that it is difficult for him to comprehend of another action; rather it is 
‘impossible’, and hence he is not judged by his actions towards the elephant, 
but instead according to whether his actions conform to the will of the crowd. 
 
Thus our conduct is no longer subject to an ethical system, internal or 
external, but rather only in relation to the will of the hegemonic structure; for 
Orwell ‘a sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to 
know his own mind and do definite things.’ (2000: 22) In conforming to the will 
of the dominant system we fulfil the only duty required of us and our reward 
for doing so is the absolution of our actions. For the officer in Moulmein this is 
offered by the judiciary system: 
 
Afterwards, of course, there was endless discussions about the 
shooting of the elephant. […] legally I had done the right thing, for a 
mad elephant has to be killed, like a mad dog, if its owner fails to 
control it. […] afterwards I was very glad [for the death of the local 
man]; it put me legally in the right and it gave me a sufficient pretext for 
shooting the elephant. (Orwell, 2000: 24-25) 
 
In this way, any and all moral and ethical duties are dismissed as contingent 
factors and subsumed under the remit of the hegemonic discourse; we need 
not suppose its external will has dominion in toto, it need only maintain its 
authority over absolute value – such is the Kantian project. By this method, 
the subject is allowed unrestricted access to all non-legislated events, actions, 
and behaviours; or, to give an example, all over 18s are entitled to view 
pornographic material no matter what their own personal qualms about such 
activities and ‘absolved of any moral repercussions’ they might incur. 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998: 232) 
  
We need not consider this as the only means by which the dominant order 
constitutes a moral vacuum either; by recapitulating our original progression 
another possibility is also reached. 
 
As an individual comes to be identified as a spectacle rather than a spectator 
then its ethical nexus is subsumed under the authority of the subject that 
observes it; for example, a child defers its moral schema to the authority of its 
parents. As a result of becoming a subject-spectacle any vestiges of personal 
ethics are dismissed. This would be an acceptable situation in an honest 
relationship, that is, if the next spectator also maintained a unified and distinct 
moral system, except the master spectator that beholds all individuals is 
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neither of these and is almost indefinitely tied to religious, cultural, and 
juridical variations.  
 
In which case – and, here is our point of departure – if we are to suppose an 
individual has any capacity for critical thought, then any spectator that 
declares an appeal to an ethical absolute should also reveal itself as a 
deceptive construct. Following this realisation an individual may opt for an 
alternative system in opposition to the master discourse; as such, they will 
approach a schema not with the basis of a moral teleology but one developed 
as the inverse to the hegemonic structure. Hence any moral vacuum 
instigated by the spectator is perpetuated by a counter-culture response as 
well. 
  
Thus in its modern manifestation, the spectacle-subject is tied to a wider issue 
concerning the disintegration of moral values. This term is not invoked as the 
tired conceit of conservative politics, but rather as Friedrich Nietzsche 
intended: that ‘morality will gradually perish’. It is ‘the great spectacle in a 
hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe – the most terrible, 
most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles.’ 
(Nietzsche, 1969: 27) According to Foucault, this prophecy has already come 
to pass: he declares that ‘the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of 
rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared.’ (Foucault, 1990a: 49) In 
following our analysis, we must agree. Our task in response to this must be 
the re-formulation of ethics according to a politics of action and not divorced 
from it; such a self-identifying moral code would be akin to the search for 
ethical absolutes that initiated our impasse to begin with following Kant. 
  
At this juncture it is expedient to detail our ethical structure as a political will. 
To found a new ethics is to wish to re-imagine and re-invent the multiple 
facets of our political subjectivation; ‘it is to wish to recreate ourselves’. In 
accord with Foucault, ethics consists of the set of attitudes, practices, and 
goals by which we guide our moral self-fashioning. Any other definition would 
refute the possibility of our current project and commit us to a series of failed 
resistances in perpetuity. These modes of self-continuation can be divided 
according to Foucault, into four principal aspects: the ethical substance, the 
mode of subjection, the practices of the self, and the mode of being, or ‘way of 
life’, towards which ethics aims. (O’Leary, 2002: 12) It is clear that dominant 
systems engage with this structure at the point of subjection, rearticulating the 
individual along a separate schema in line with itself rather than in connection 
with the ethical substance of a subject and perpetuating itself on the pretence 
of a moral tautology. 
  
This first aspect, the ethical substance, is the part of a subject that it takes as 
the material of its own moral conduct; i.e., its own acts, desires, feelings. 
According to Foucault, in both the Classical era and in ancient Greece the 
ethical substance was considered as the base strata from which the resulting 
system was established. (Foucault, 1992: 38) It was invoked to cover desires 
and acts as well as pleasures. Second, there is the mode of subjection; that 
is, the manner in which a subject follows a coded order in response to their 
substance within; it could be ‘a divine command’, or a duty to perform a 
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certain responsibility. (O’Leary, 2002: 12) In the Classical era, according to 
Foucault, the mode of subjection was a ‘personal choice’ (Foucault, 1992b: 
356) and gave the subject its value according to the moral system. Third, 
there are the ‘forms of elaboration’ of self; that is, the techniques used to 
constitute the self as an ethical subject, ranging from the interpolation of 
human rights or legal doctrine, to the ‘self-examination of thoughts and 
actions.’ (O’Leary, 2002: 12) Finally, there is the ‘teleology of the moral 
subject’; that is, the formulating of an ideal to be reached as an ethical 
subject. It is best illustrated by the example of religion, since an afterlife is a 
palpable expression of a moral teleology. 
  
Our task now must be to conceive of a subject system that has at its base the 
re-actualisation of ethical substance as a political force, so as to offer a 
‘resistance to the dominant schema’ of subject-spectacle relations. (Heller, 
1996: 90) As such Foucault allows for a ‘descriptive critique’ (Ransom, 2002: 
3) of our current situation without forgoing an absolutism that would invoke the 
spectacle-subject again under a different guise. By this Foucault offers a 
model of resistance that makes available a rich and suggestive answer for 
political action (Pickett, 1996: 447), yet, in doing so, foregrounds the individual 
freedom of morality via the suppression of inter-subject social dilemmas. In 
his invocation of power as an omnipotent spectator, one writ large upon the 
psyche of the common individual, Foucault dismisses all practical ethics as 
wandering in the realm of the dictator. Žižek allows us to see how the ought-
to-do offered us by Foucault is also unwittingly an ought-to-do only when 
watched; the reason it is so hidden a title is because there is always the figure 
watching over, or rather, our conscience. 
  
In articulating this conclusion though, we approach the presence of the 
passive spectator in a more knowledgeable light: either the subject is socially 
responsible to their image as a subject-spectacle, therefore we must consider 
their inactivity as the acceptable norm, or else, intervention is a social 
requirement and the subject does not consider themselves as actually being 
watched by a powerful enough observer to enforce this edict. These are to be 
understood as the two most common interpretations of the situation. Yet if we 
follow in an explanation guided by our analysis of Foucault, then the subject 
reveals itself only as subject-spectacle and never as the spectator-subject. 
This is how Leontius presents a radical variation on the typical ‘crises of 
subjectivation’ (Foucault, 1990b: 95), since he represents an individual who 
damns his own position as a subject who observes; by cursing his eyes 
Leontius admits not only to his role as a subject-spectacle to his own 
conscience, but also as the spectator-subject complicit in the event he 
observes. Thus Leontius holds already the required moral teleology. 
  
In which case, we must be careful though in divorcing all moral command to 
the power above, whatever that entity may be, since our own perspective is 
absolved of any ethical complicity. Thus, if a prison guard is assigned the 
execution of an inmate the state legislates for his absolution upon the 
completion of his task. Orwell offers us such an event in ‘A Hanging’. Again 
set in Burma, our unnamed narrator is an officer attached to the garrison of a 
local prison: 
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It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to 
destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step aside 
to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of 
cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was 
alive just as we were alive. […] He and we were a party of men walking 
together, seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding the same world; and 
in two minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone – one 
mind less, one world less. (Orwell, 2000: 16) 
 
In actions our identities are formed; in them, we enact and thus define 
ourselves as social beings, often in contrast to the ideal we imagine ourselves 
to be, yet by his inaction the guard is transparent against the social order. To 
want to act is not the same as actually committing the deed, but our ideal is 
still as caustic upon our psyche, especially when we fall so short of it: 
 
We looked at the lashed, hooded man on the drop, and listened to his 
cries – each cry another second of life; the same thought was in all our 
minds; oh, kill him quickly, get it over, stop that abominable noise! 
  
Suddenly the superintendent made up his mind. Throwing up his head 
he made a swift motion with his stick. ‘Chalo!’ he shouted almost 
fiercely. (Orwell, 2000: 17) 
 
As Orwell himself remarks, we all rail against inequalities and injustice, yet 
very few seriously want to abolish them. ‘Here you come upon the important 
fact that every revolutionary opinion draws part of its strength from a secret 
conviction that nothing can be changed.’ (Orwell, 2001: 38) He distinguishes 
apathy to be the standard sentiment amongst man, whereas in fact, we are 
convinced by the hegemonic order that we have an innate immoral state. It is 
this same structure that also offers the means to our absolution via the 
disavowal of ethical value in general.  
 
Orwell presents the release of this moral debt as almost euphoric, bringing 
fellow man together under its umbrella of absolution; even though the real 
source of this happiness can never be known to the subject: 
 
Several people laughed – at what, nobody was certain. 
[…] 
We all began laughing again. At that moment Francis’s anecdote 
seemed extraordinarily funny. We all had a drink together, native and 
European alike, quite amicably. The dead man was a hundred yards 
away. (Orwell, 2000: 18) 
 
It is a simple example, yet its necessary power is clear: by referring all ethical 
consideration to a symbolic spectator then the subject is divorced of its 
personal system. In doing so the subject gains an ethical shield behind which 
it can engage in all manner of behaviours, actions, and beliefs as long as they 
are sanctioned by the governing system. It even allows for a freedom beyond 
the moral law: the subject can now refuse to submit to the governing system 
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under the pretence of claiming its own ethical construct, except this new 
system will only be conceived in opposition to the overarching powers rather 
than as the arrival of an independent, self-generated ethics and as such is 
equally devoid of meaning. 
 
It is the moral relativism of current social and political thought that is 
expressed as the opposite to the above sentiment, instead regarding both 
positions as meaningful ethical constructs. (Rajchman, 1986: 179) In this 
manner, the prioritisation of the dictator-spectator figure is perpetuated along 
with the continued inactivity towards events of ethical significance. Without 
developing a political and social will in line with personal subjectivation, as 
Foucault considers it, then the subject will continue to be considered merely 
as the spectacle itself rather than the means by which the spectacle event 
may be interacted with. (Rajchman, 1986: 165) As Žižek consistently 
declares: ‘sometimes, doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.’ (Žižek, 
2008: 183) 
 
In the same manner, Foucault declares the means by which to assess the 
function of ethics as both a form of domination and the form by which it may 
become more liberated. It must be made sure though that this does not 
develop into the re-nominalisation of a moral system by which societal 
intervention is denied access to the welfare of the individual, such a utilitarian 
framework would involve the evolution of a political law homologous to that 
which is currently in place. 
  
Our future pathway is a manoeuvre between these extremes, not itself a 
compromise but an interplay of both spectator and spectacle without either 
force exerting too great a social or political impact. In this we avoid the danger 
Nietzsche declares as the ‘moral chatter of some about others.’ (Nietzsche, 
1974: § 335) Instead criticism can itself gain the role of a mode of subjection, 
as Foucault considers criticism as a kind of ‘virtue’, that is, an endeavour 
worthwhile in its own right. (Ransom, 2002: 3) It may appear Foucault dashes 
the hope, if we had one, that there is some ‘good we can affirm’ (Taylor, 1984: 
152) as a result of the understanding these analyses give us; yet, in re-
articulating the social and political limitations of ‘ought’ and ‘is’ via their 
realisation as subject and spectacle, then perhaps we have ‘free[d] thought 
from what it silently thinks’, allowing us to ‘think otherwise.’ (Foucault, 1992: 
14-15) 
  
If there is a lesson here, it should be to resist the lure of absolution; we should 
reject ethics, in the name of politics. When violence has become a spectacle, 
when the subject has become a spectacle, empathy should become a dirty 
word; instead it is complicity that should be felt. Only in this way can we call 
forth a politics of action. 
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